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Harmonizing Competing Ethnonationalisms?:
A Bill of Rights for a New South Africa

Lynn Berat
Yale University

INTRODUCTION
The story of present-day South Africa is one of competing
ethnonationalisms. Whites are divided into the English-speaking
and long-ruling Afrikaans-speaking groups. 1 Once exceedingly
antagonistic toward one another because of historic animosities,
the groups have now largely cast aside their differences in favor
of a more united front against a perceived common black enemy. 2
Blacks, as the oppressed prefer to call themselves, for decades
have been divided by whites into Asians, Coloureds (mixed race),
and Africans (subdivided into ten different groups). 3 Yet, the yoke
of white domination has, contrary to government desires and with
certain ominous exceptions, united rather than divided blacks in
their struggle against apartheid. Thus, the major cleavage in the
battle for a new South Africa is between whites and blacks. To be
white is to enjoy political and economic power and privilege,
while to be black is to be denied such advantages. The arena in
which the battle is being fought is increasingly the legal one. This
has been made possible in part through the extraordinary developments that have occurred in South Africa in the last year.
The 1990s began in South Africa with some dramatic
changes. In early February, State President F.W. De Klerk made
a speech which many took as an indication that he was serious
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about transforming South Africa. 4 The measures announced included the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC),
the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the South African Communist Party and other groups; 5 the lifting of restrictions on thirtythree other organizations including the powerful Congress of
South African Trade Unions; the release of most political prisoners; the lifting of restrictions on 374 freed detainees; the limiting
of detention without trial to six months, with provision for legal
representation and medical treatment; and a moratorium on hangings . De Klerk also indicated that he would free ANC leader
Nelson Mandela, perhaps the world's most famous political
prisoner, after twenty-seven years in jail. 6
Mandela's release a few days later was accompanied by
jubilation from many of his compatriots as millions watched
worldwide. Mandela proceeded to tour numerous foreign countries where he was greeted by adoring crowds. At home, the ANC
held meetings with the government on "talks about talks" and set
up offices throughout the country . Organizing by other unbanned
groups also went into high gear. In June, De Kl erk announced the
lifting of the four year-old state of emergency for all of South
Africa except Natal where fighting between those loyal to Chief
Mangosuthu Buthelezi's rural, Zulu Inkatha movement and supporters of the broad-based anti-apartheid coalition known as the
Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) continued to claim many
African lives. 7 Although the violence continued, De Klerk later
lifted that state of emergency as well.
Many came to believe the promise of De Klerk's February
speech that "[h]enceforth, everybody's political points of view
will be tested against their realism, their workability and their
fairness ... The time for negotiation has arrived.',s Graffiti in some
African townships even proclaimed, "Viva Comrade De Klerk!"
Yet, euphoria quickly evaporated as people recognized that despite the unprecedented occurrences, the main pillars of apartheid
the Natives Land Act, the Group Areas Act, and the Population
Registration Act - remained intact. 9 At the same time, the
government was steadfast in its refusal to release prisoners sentenced for offenses such as murder, terrorism, and arson on behalf
of political organizations. To make matters worse, by December,
South Africa teetered perilously on the brink of collapsing in
internecine convulsions as Africans, allegedly with police complicity, brutalized and murdered each other in areas throughout
the country in conflicts fueled by urban-rural, class, and ethnic
tensions. 10
Even as De Klerk ordered an investigation into the situation in response to ANC allegations of government involvement,
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it was clear that any new order somehow would have to provide
sufficient human rights guarantees so that, at its birth, a new South
Africa would not be baptized in blood. For both the white
supporters of the government and the overwhelmingly black
membership of the ANC and other anti-apartheid groups, this
realization has led to an insistence that the constitution of a new
South Africa contain a bill of rights to be interpreted by an
independent judiciary. That is where the agreement ends. Closer
examination reveals two radically different conceptions of such a
document which reflect the clash between competing black and
white ethnonationalisms. Indeed, it is the South African legal
heritage that has grown out of white desire to suppress black
nationalism, including the failure of the white minority to create
respect for the rule oflaw among blacks, that will, inevitably, play
adecisiverole in the fate of any bill of rights. Ultimately, the entire
legal culture will have to be transformed before any constitution
can be successful.
This article proposes that some progress can be made
toward such a transformation if South Africa adopts a constitution
with an Africanist bill of rights. Part I explores the bill of rights
debate currently raging in South Africa. Part II offers suggestions
for an Africanist bill of rights.

I. The Bill of Ri~hts Debate
When the British colonies of the Cape of Good Hope and
Natal joined with the two former Afrikaner republics of the
Orange Free State and the Transvaal in 1910 to form the Union of
South Africa, the country adopted a system of parliamentary
supremacy. 11 This meant that with the exception of three entrenched constitutional clauses which had to be amended by a
special procedure, all legislation passed by a simple parliamentary majority became the supreme law of the land. Unlike the
United States, where the judges are free to declare legislation
unconstitutional, in South Africa there was nothing but custom to
check parliamentary excesses. In the new polity such custom was
lacking with regard to blacks. Accordingly, many discriminatory
and repressive laws were passed by Parliament after U nion. 12 The
number of such laws grew prodigiously after 1948 when the
National Party came to power with its slogan "apartheid." 13
Custom has, however, been sufficient to restrain parliamentary actions in Britain from which South Africa took its
model. 14 The distinguishing factors there were: l) the progressive
extension of the franchise to incorporate all elements of society,
in contrast to the South African case where the franchise became
less inclusive in the years after Union, and 2) a tradition ofrespect
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for the notion of the rule of law.
Although the concept of the rule of law has generated
countless pages of writing, four generalizations are opposite. 15
First, there must be representative government or to use Abraham
Lincoln's phrase, the government must be "of, by, and for the
people. " 16 Second, there must be acceptance of the notion of
equality before the law. Third, there must be procedural and
substantive limits on government action against the individual.
Thus, there is the belief that fundamental freedoms are not to be
abrogated arbitrarily by the state. Fourth, review by an independent judiciary must be a central mechanism for constitutional
enforcement. Central to the viability of the concept of the rule of
law is the assumption that the legislature will adhere to such
principles in all its decision-making.
In the South African case, the legislature has never adhered to the rule oflaw with regard to blacks. Only by abrogating
black rights has the white-minority regime been able to ensure its
survival. Particularly in the post-1948 years, the government has
continually enlarged its arsenal of security legislation and since
1983, concentrated ever greater powers in the hands of the
executive. 17 According to South African jurist J.D. van der Vyver
[i]nstead of applying its supremacy in accordance
with the historical purpose of a sovereign parliament, to keep a tight rein on the powers of government, the South African legislature on the contrary
utilized its dominant authority to confer on the
executive extensive, and in many instances excessive or even arbitrary, competencies-thereby converting the ~ ~ institution of parliamentary
sovereignty into a~ .fu£1Qstate of executive supremacy ... 1s
Underlying this executive-minded behavior has been an obsession with legalism (legal formalism) among the Nationalists there is a law for everything - and the view that such laws, no
matter how draconian, are just simply because they are laws.
Assisting to reinforce this obsession with legalism has
been the all-white and nearly all-male South African judiciary
which has been loath to challenge the executive. Supporters of the
judges have argued that the judges merely have been acting in
accordance with their proper role in a system of parliamentary
supremacy, i.e. to declare the law and not to make it. 19 The judges'
task is only to see that the manner of promulgation was procedurally correct and that executive action was taken "in terms of' the
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legislation.
In practice, however, this positivistic justification has
been an excuse for the generally conservative judges, many of
whom are National Party supporters, to lend approval to the
underlying moral assumptions of the legislation they are called
upon to construe. South African jurist M.G. Cowling has argued
that "within the framework of legislative supremacy, the positivistic approach to judicial decision-making provides an extremely
convenient cloak behind which judges can hide their 'inarticulate
major rremisses' by attributing inequitable results to the legislation."2 According to Cowling, these premisses are the "underlying motives, perceptions, [and] political outlook[s]" that mould a
judge's interpretation of the law as it is envisioned by the legislature. In the South African case, it is not implausible to suggest that,
for many judges, such premisses include beliefs in white domination and continued hegemony, the need to preserve state security,
and fear of communism. 21
The unhappy result of the judiciary's captivity to such
premises has been that, instead of protecting human rights, the
courts - especially the A.D. - have routinely upheld the draconian
will of the executive. In many cases involving security legislation,
most recently in Omar, 22 Fani, 23 and Bill, 24 the courts have
deferred to the executive's authority in matters concerning state
security. Such cases have revealed that the judiciary, in its refusal
to protect even the most basic civil liberties, is largely a rubber
stamp for executive decisions. Indeed, some South African scholars have even suggested that more liberal judges resign in an effort
to underscore the proposition that, under present conditions, it is
inappropriate to speak of an independent judiciary. 25
Views such as these have led to calls for a redefinition of
the role of the South African judiciary so that it could become an
effective guardian of human rights. To effect such a change in
orientation there have been demands for the introduction of a bill
of rights which would give the judiciary standards for protecting
human rights by "restricting the competence of persons in authority to curtail those rights and freedoms by means of legislative or
administrative interference." 26Consequently, some scholars have
argued that a South African bill of rights would free judges from
the constraints of legislative supremacy, providing a "recourse to
a positive human rights standard that operates independently of
the legislative will and to which the latter [would] be subordinated."27 Without a bill of rights there would be a penumbra
surrounding the institutional jurisdiction forthe protection of civil
liberties. Thus, the, the argument goes, the entrenchment of a bill
of rights would not only protect individual rights and freedoms but
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also serve to promote the institutional integrity of thejudiciary. 28
Even as progressive scholars have sought a bill of rights,
conservative members of the politico-legal establishment also
have turned their attention in that direction. 29 However, their
interest springs not from their desire to nurture the rule of law in
a non-racial democratic state but from their perception that the
days of white minority rule are numbered and that a bill of rights
is the best way of safeguarding property and minority rights. With
such disparate views, it is not surprising that disagreements over
what form such a document should take are profound.
A bill of rights can incorporate three types of rights. 30 First,
procedural rights guarantee that the individual is subject to a
judicial process that ensures equal treatment under the law,
impartiality, and fairness. Second, substantive rights protect
fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression, movement,
assembly, association, and franchise and may include group
rights. Procedural and substantive rights appear almost universally in bills of rights. Third, economic rights guarantee the
individual's basic material needs such as employment and housing and frequently include freedom from hunger, and access to
free medical care and education, sometimes even tertiary education. This last category of rights can be described as the right to
expect. Not historically part of western constitutions, economic
rights increasingly are being incorporated into the constitutions of
many social democracies and third world states. 31 Economic
rights differ from procedural and substantive rights because, as
South African historian T.R.H. Davenport has written, they reflect their proponents' assumptions that diverge "from the strictly
individualist view of society to which the more basic civil liberties
seem logically to belong, by laying down socio-economic standards which must be realized if the individual is to be able to
exercise his basic freedoms with profit to himself and the community."32
The South African debate surrounding a bill of rights
centers on the concepts of economic and minority rights. Many
aligned with the MDM believe that any proposed bill of rights
must ensure, or at least must not obstruct, the economic redistribution which must follow the abolition of the apartheid state. If
there is no state-directed economic redress, the argument goes, the
members of the white community will simply substitute their
current racially-defined supremacy with an economically-defined one reflecting their already superior economic status, a
status acquired at the expense of blacks. 33Moreover, the guarantee of certain minimal economic standards will be the only way of
infusing meaning into blacks' newly-secured political rights. As
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black advocate Ernest Moseneke contends, "the right to development. .. is probably more crucial than the right to vote; not as a
favour which somebody hands out, but a right that you can claim
and enforce. . . anything less than that is going to in effect
perpetuate the present system." 34
For many blacks, capitalism as practiced in South Africa
and civil liberties as propounded by the government and interpreted by the judiciary are wedded in a conspiracy of oppression
aimed at preserving and perpetuating inequality in economic
relations. In this context, the concern of the ANC is not so much
with individual property rights as it is with the enormous concentration of monopoly capital in a few huge white-controlled corporations and holding companies. Drawing from the 1955 Freedom
Charter, 35 ANC draft constitutional guidelines proposed in 1989
emphasized the need to vest the state "with the right to determine
the general context in which economic like takes place and define
and limit the rights and obligations attaching to the ownership and
use of productive capacity." 36
The document distinguished between individual property
owners and the collective wealth of the corporations. Accordingly, it envisioned that "[p ]roperty for personal use and consumption shall be constitutionally entrenched" 37 while privatelyowned companies and transnational corporations "sha]l be obliged
to co-operate with the state in realising the objectives of the
Freedom Charter in promoting social well-being." 38
The inclusion of provisions such as this in a new bill of
rights will, no doubt, fail to calm white fears of expropriation and,
at the same time, anger blacks whose societies have been destroyed by the government's policy of forced removals. Failure to
deal with the land question will not win the government blacks'
confidence. Yet, if Namibia, which is confronted with a similar
problem, is any indication, the new government may not be able
to develop a policy acceptable to both sides for some time after
independence and maybe even never.
The government has not offered any solutions capable of
satisfying whites and blacks and has favored maintaining the
status quo with regard to the protection of existing property rights.
This preference manifested itself in the South African Law
Commission's 1989 Working_ Paper on Group and Human
Rights. 39 The Commission, established in 1973 by an Act of
Parliament, consists of members of the judiciary, legal profession
(including academic lawyers), the magistrates' bench, and officials of the Department of Justice. Its mandate was "to investigate
and make recommendations on the definition and protection of
group rights in the context of the South African constitutional set96

up and the possible extension of the existing protection of individual rights as well as the role the courts play or should play ... "40
The Commission stressed that economic rights should be
protected only "in the negative sense that legislation and executive acts shall not infringe them. A bill of rights is not the place for
enforcing positive obligations against the state." 41
A number of white legal scholars have justified this
resistance to any constitutional guarantees of economic redistribution in arguments that revolve around judicial competence to
deal with such matters. Legal scholar Cowling and Natal judge
John Didcott contend thatthe judiciary is ill-equipped to deal with
issues of economic policy .42 Therefore, a bill of rights should be
free of economic standards to which the central government
would be bound and the judiciary obliged to review. As to
property rights, they insist that the judges be neither spoilers of
economic redistribution nor rubber stamps for arbitrary expropriation. They are determined that there be a "neutral" bill of rights
to act as a "shield" and not a "sword. "43 This neutrality is crucial,
they maintain, because South African judges are neither qualified
nor in possession of the resources and enforcement capabilities
necessary to adjudicate issues arising out of economic restructuring.44 Such questions of economic restructuring are "political"
problems and not germane to jurisprudential deliberation.
Unfortunately, these observers fail to explain why the
judges would be ill-equipped to pass on such matters. An explanation can be found in the Law Commission report's distinction
between positive and negative rights. 45 Substantive rights seek to
prevent the state from infringing upon individual liberties while
economic rights seek to compel the state to fulfill an obligation.
Thus, it is for the judges to determine that the state has acted
arbitrarily and not that it has not complied with minimal economic
guarantees. This argument, however, is unpersuasive. If the
judges can ascertain whether the state has abrogated fundamental
freedoms such as freedom of the press or speech, they can just as
easily determine whether the government has failed to strive for
the minimum standards enshrined in the constitution. To suggest
that these are political problems not appropriate for adjudication
is to engage in perpetuating the positivist myth upon which the
South African judiciary has relied for decades.
South African legal scholar John Dugard has taken the
middle ground. He contends that property rights are not the sine
qua non of a bill of rights. 46 Rather, rights of expropriation with
delayed orreduced compensation can furnish the means of obtaining economic redress. While many Africans may feel that compensation is unnecessary because the whites stole the land from
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them, the new government will still have to recognize international economic realities. If there is no adequate compensation,
international corporations and banks will undoubtedly consider
the country a poor risk and the massive investment that South
Africa will require if it is to improve the standard of living of its
people will never materialize. 47 Even with the acceptance of
Dugard' s suggestion about compensation, there is no reason why
property rights also cannot be incorporated in a bill of rights.
As for the question of minority rights, the South African
government has insisted that these be protected in any bill of
rights. The Law Commission's report drew a distinction between
political group rights and other group values such as culture,
religion, and language. 48 It determined that the latter should be
protected as individual rights in the bill of rights and that the
former be protected in the rest of the constitution. The ANC's
Constitutional Guidelines also recognize culture, religion, and
language as individual rights. 49 The idea of group political guarantees, however, is at odds with the document which provides for
"a system of universal suffrage based on the principles of one
person, one vote. " 50 In October 1990, the government appeared to
back away from its insistence on group political rights. The
Deputy Constitutional Minister Rolf Meyer stated that the government had abandoned the notion of demanding recognition of
"group rights" based on race or color "in any form whatever." 51
Despite his rejection of the group rights approach, however,
Meyer then indicated that the government was looking at various
constitutional mechanisms established elsewhere to protect the
white minority, "first of all a bill of rights." 52
It seems that no constitution will ever receive black
acceptance unless it creates the perception that it is bias free. The
protection of minority interests will perpetuate existing inequalities and diminish or destroy the new government's credibility. If
a new government is truly committed to the rule oflaw, there will
be no need for minority rights if individual rights are protected.
Whites are not easily persuaded by such statements. After all, they
well know that their representatives have long used the law as an
instrument of oppression. What would prevent a black-dominated
government from behaving in a similar fashion? Moreover, life
under apartheid has made it impossible for many whites to
conceive of a unitary, non-racial state. Their world view is one of
ever competing black and white nationalisms. For them, as
historian T.R.H. Davenport has noted, "[t]he frontiers of nationalism tend to stop short with the frontiers of the in-group to which
the rights of out-groups are really irrelevant since they are presumed to be antagonistic. The nationalist, moreover, tends not to
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think in universals, for the very concept of universality makes
nonsense of nationalist group particularism." 53 Accordingly, the
challenge for drafters of a bill of rights is to create a document
acceptable to both sides. One possible way of doing so is by
creating a document that is Africanist and internationalist at the
same time. Such a document would appeal to international standards of human rights, particularly those which enjoy broad
acceptance in the rest of Africa.
IL An Africanist Blll of Riqhts
International human rights norms are contained in many
documents. In the African context, the most relevant is the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, popularly known as the
Banjul Charter. 54 Adopted as a regional treaty by the Organisation
of African Unity (OAU)in 1981, it entered into force, contrary to
most expectations, only five years later in October 1986. Thus far
it has been ratified or acceded to by thirty-five African states or
some two-thirds of the OAU members. 55 This makes it the largest
regional human rights system in existence. 56 While most of the
states party to the Charter have failed to concretize the lofty ideals
it contains, the document is significant because it reflects the
African affirmation of international human rights standards. 57 It
also furnishes African solutions to the issues of economic and
group rights.
For South Africa, use of many of the Charter's tenets in a
bill of rights would enable it to create a truly Africanist jurisprudence and, at the same time, express solidarity with the rest of the
international community on key human rights issues. Adherence
to such principles could make South Africa a model for the respect
of human rights not only in Africa but also in the world, a lofty goal
but one worth striving for.
The Banjul Charter enumerates various individual rights,
many of which are recognized in African constitutions. Among
them are the rights to: non-discrimination; 58 equality and equal
protection under the law; 59 life; 60 the respect of human dignity; 61
liberty; 62 have one's cause heard, i.e the right to certain minimum
standards during legal proceedings; 63 freedom of conscience and
religion; 64 freedom of expression and dissemination of opinion; 65
freedom of association; 66 freedom of assembly; 67 freedom of
movement; 68 participation in government and access to public
services and public property; 69 and property. 70 In this respect the
Charter has much in common with other older universal instruments such as the United Nations Charter 71 and regional instruments such as the European 72 and American 73 conventions. While
endeavoring to reflect an African conception of human rights, the
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drafters recognized that it would be imprudent to deviate too much
from norms already established in other international human
rights instruments. In so doing, they accepted the concept that
human rights are universal and "transcend the boundaries of
nation, race, and belief." 74
At the same time, the Charter is unique among international and human rights treaties in its enumeration of civil and
political rights as well as economic, social, and cultural rights. The
inclusion indicates that the two categories of rights are of fundamental importance and intertwined. It also refutes the argument
by some South African jurists that both kinds of rights are not
justiciable. 75 Nowhere in the Charter is there the suggestion that
civil and political rights are inferior to or may be suspended by the
government in order to promote economic, social, and cultural
rights, or vice versa.
The economic, social, and cultural rights guaranteed to
individuals include the rights to: work and equal pay for equal
work; 76 health; 77 and education. 78 With regard to the practical
application of such rights, in most African countries - and a
majority-ruled South Africa would no exception - it is difficult to
imagine how they can be guaranteed when the economy is not
sufficiently developed (e.g. the right to work) or the necessary
infrastructure is absent (e.g. the rights to health and education).
Nevertheless, even though it may take many years before state
action can begin to ensure anything like the full implementation
of these rights, their inclusion mandates that existing public
facilities be made available to all on a non-discriminatory basis 79
and provides minimum standards by which state actions can be
judged. For example, the Charter requires non-discrimination in
the allocation of government economic resources. Thus, a court
could declare unconstitutional any misallocation of resources
where the government deprived some members of the community
of services essential to development for reasons unrelated to
economic feasibility or general principles of proportionality. The
role of the judiciary in enforcing such economic rights has been
demonstrated in recent years by the judges of the Indian Supreme
Court who, guided by specific directives contained in India's
Constitution, have freely developed the common law. 80
The Charter also includes a right to property ownership
which appears in the First Protocol to the European Convention
but is absent from both United Nations Covenants on Human
Rights. 81 This right is in line, too, with Dugard's middle path on
expropriation with just compensation. 82 The Charter indicates that
the right to property may be encroached upon only for public
purposes or "in the general interest of the community and in
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accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws. 83 At the same
time, the state has an obligation to "promote respect, equitable
exchange, and the principles of international law. "84 This implies
that nationalization of property owned by foreigners such as
multinational corporations and business assets is lawful only if the
government complies with the appropriate international legal
standards, including the payment of just compensation. Hence, in
cases of expropriation or nationalization, courts are free to ascertain whether the state has overstepped its bounds in taking
property. Thus, a bill of rights based on the Banjul Charter would
address the economic concerns of both sides in South Africa. On
the issue of group rights, the Charter also provides guidance.
A unique aspect of the Banjul Charter is its inclusion of
rights attributable to "peoples." These rights, which appear even
in the title, distinguish it from the European and American
conventions. The drafters of the Charter believed that it was
central to the "African" conception of human rights. It was meant
to be reflective of the importance of the community in African
culture, particularly because collective agricultural and other
efforts have often been essential to ensure survival. It was within
the group that individuals had identity in African customary law
and expulsion from the group was one of the most serious
punishments that could be inflicted on the individual. 85
In fact, "peoples"' rights in Charter are the rights of the
individual. 86 No new rights have been created and accordingly no
new rights arise for adjudication. However, given the legacy of
apartheid with its deliberate attempt to classify everyone as a
member of a racially- or ethnically-defined group, a reference to
"peoples'" rights in a South African bill of rights might appear to
furnish a means of perpetuating divisions. To guard against the
rise of vocal lobbies clamoring for special treatment based on a
misinterpretation of the phrase, it would be best to incorporate
only individual rights with no special provisions protecting group
rights. As long as individual freedoms are guaranteed, people will
be free to band together as they please. Certainly, this has been the
case elsewhere in the decolonized world, most notably in Zimbabwe and Namibia, where little has changed in the exclusivist
world of social relations.
There is one aspect of group rights where the Charter has
much to offer a South Africa in which the horrors of apartheid,
especially the migrant labor system, have destroyed the family.
The Charter provides that the family "shall be the natural unit and
basis of society." 87 It gives the state the duties to: safeguard the
physical, health, and moral welfare of the family; 88 assist the
family, which is the custodian of moral and traditional values
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recognized by the community; 89 eliminate discrimination against
women; 90 and protect internationally-recognized women's and
children's rights. 91 This family-oriented approach, framed in
terms of positive obligations, differs from that taken in the
European 92 and American 93 conventions, which merely provide
for the absence of interference in family life. The Charter reflects
the drafters' belief in the family including the extended family as central to African values. 94 Such views would find wide
acceptance among black South Africans who have witnessed the
crumbling of family life under white domination. It also would
satisfy whites, particularly Afrikaners who often stress their
commitment to family life. Family guarantees in a South African
bill of rights would serve as guiding principles for judges called
upon to assess the government's compliance in the enactment of
social legislation and the formulation of social policies.
The obligations the Charter places upon the state are not
one-sided. The Charter has an unparalleled approach which
places requirements on the individual as well. In the South African
case, these duties would demand the commitment of all to reconciliation. It is not enough for individuals merely to expect protection from the state. Rather, they should participate actively in the
creation of a more just social order.
The African Charter stands alone among regional human
rights instruments in its stipulation that "every individual shall
have duties towards his family and society, the State and other
legal~ recognized communities and the international community.' 5 This differs from the European Convention, which is
silent on the matter, and the American Convention, which recognizes obligations to the family, community, and humanity but
does not enumerate the duties. 96 In contrast, the African Charter
imposes a duty on the individual to consider his fellow human
beings without discrimination. 97 It then lists specific duties such
as respect for the family, the maintenance of parents in case of
need, and the preservation of the family's harmonious development. 98 Broader social obligations include the duty to place one's
intellectual and physical abilities at the service of the community,
to work to the best of one's ability and competence, and to
preserve positive cultural values in one's relations with other
members of the society in a spirit of tolerance. Additional duties
include the preservation of national unity and the territorial
integrity of the country and the contribution to national defense in
accordance with the law. If incorporated into a South African bill
of rights, many of these, although in the nature of moral obligations, at least would serve to set a tone of morality in a country
where their denial has caused immeasurable suffering. Other
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duties, such as the one to maintain parents, could properly be
regarded as legal obligations enforceable in courts of law. These
would present a challenge of interpretation to judges. Indeed, the
issue of judicial interpretation will be one of the most vexing in a
new South Africa. 99 Ultimately, of course, it is with the people that
the greatest challenges for any new order will lie. However, an
Africanist bill of rights can at least aid them to overcome ethnonationalistic animosities and create a more humane society.

CONCLUSION
In recent years, the South African government has come
under ever increasing threats to its domination from without and
within. Internal black protests and political organizing have
reached unprecedented levels. Pressure from anti-apartheid groups
around the world has persuaded many members of the international community to bring pressure on the government through
economic sanctions and diplomatic moves. With the advent of an
independent Namibia, South Africa has become the only country
in Africa still ruled by a white minority government. Already, the
eyes of the international community are focussed on South Africa
as the next target for change. Recognizing and in many cases
fearing the inevitability of black majority rule, the white politicolegal establishment which rules South Africa has recently placed
much emphasis on introducing a bill of rights for the country. As
discussion of this issue has raged in white political circles, the
ANC has also turned its attention to the same issue while it
grapples with the question of a post-apartheid legal order. Both
sides are in particular disagreement over the issues of economic
and minority rights.
One way to harmonize these differences would be for
drafters to adopt a South African bill of rights that draws upon the
Banjul Charter. Reliance on the Charter would result in the
creation of a document that is both Africanist and internationalist
in orientation by appealing to international standards of human
rights, particularly those which are widely recognized in the rest
of Africa. While such a document alone will not free the new
country from abuses by the judiciary and the executive, it will at
least furnish ammunition for those South Africans - black and
white - who are bent on harmonizing competing ethnonationalisms so that a truly non-racial order may emerge.
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